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The Relay-Eavesdropper Channel: Cooperation
for Secrecy
Lifeng Lai and Hesham El Gamal
Abstract
This paper establishes the utility of user cooperation in facilitating secure wireless communications.
In particular, the four-terminal relay-eavesdropper channel is introduced and an outer-bound on the
optimal rate-equivocation region is derived. Several cooperation strategies are then devised and the
corresponding achievable rate-equivocation region are characterized. Of particular interest is the novel
Noise-Forwarding (NF) strategy, where the relay node sends codewords independent of the source
message to confuse the eavesdropper. This strategy is used to illustrate the deaf helper phenomenon,
where the relay is able to facilitate secure communications while being totally ignorant of the transmitted
messages. Furthermore, NF is shown to increase the secrecy capacity in the reversely degraded scenario,
where the relay node fails to offer performance gains in the classical setting. The gain offered by the
proposed cooperation strategies is then proved theoretically and validated numerically in the additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon introduced the notion of information theoretic secrecy in [1]. The model in [1]
assumed that the transmission is noiseless, and used a key K to protect the confidential message
W . Taking the transmission uncertainty into consideration, Wyner introduced the wiretap channel
in [2]. In the three-terminal wiretap channel, a source wishes to transmit confidential messages to
a destination while keeping the messages as secret as possible from a wiretapper. The wiretapper
is assumed to have an unlimited computation ability and to know the coding/decoding scheme
used in the main (source-destination) channel. Under the assumption that the source-wiretapper
channel is a degraded version of the main channel, Wyner characterized the trade-off between
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2the throughput of the main channel and the level of ignorance of the message at the wiretapper
using the rate-equivocation region concept. Loosely speaking, the equivocation rate measures the
residual ambiguity about the transmitted message at the wiretapper. If the equivocation rate at the
wiretapper is arbitrarily close to the information rate, the transmission is called perfectly secure.
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner extended this work to the broadcast channel with confidential messages,
where the source sends common information to both the destination and the wiretapper, and
confidential messages are sent only to the destination [3].
Our work here is motivated by the fact that if the wiretapper channel is less noisy than the main
channel1, the perfect secrecy capacity of the channel is zero [3]. In this case, it is infeasible
to establish a secure link under Wyner’s wiretap channel model. Our main idea is to exploit
user cooperation in facilitating the transmission of confidential messages from the source to the
destination. More specially, we consider a four-terminal relay-eavesdropper channel, where a
source wishes to send messages to a destination while leveraging the help of a relay node to
hide those messages from the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper in our model can be viewed as
the wireless counterpart of Wyner’s wiretapper. This model generalizes the relay channel [4] and
the wiretap channel [2].
The relay channel without security constraints was studied under various scenarios [4]–[12].
In most of these works, cooperation strategies were constructed to increase the transmission
rate and/or reliability function. In this paper, we identify a novel role of the relay node in
establishing a secure link from the source to the destination. Towards this end, several cooperation
strategies for the relay-eavesdropper channel are constructed and the corresponding achieved rate-
equivocation regions are characterized. An outer-bound on the optimal rate-equivocation region
is also derived. The proposed schemes are shown to achieve a positive perfect secrecy rate in
several scenarios where the secrecy capacity in the absence of the relay node is zero. Quite
interestingly, we establish the deaf-helper phenomenon where the relay can help while being
totally ignorant of the transmitted message from the source. Furthermore, we show that the
relay node can aid in the transmission of confidential messages in some settings where classical
cooperation fails to offer performance gains, e.g., the reversely degraded relay channel. Finally,
1The source-wiretapper channel is said to be less noisy than the source-receiver channel, if for every V → X → Y Z,
I(V ; Z) ≥ I(V ; Y ), where X is the signal transmitted by the source, Y, Z are the received signal of the receiver and the
wiretapper respectively.
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3we observe that the proposed Noise-Forwarding (NF) is intimately related with the multiple
access channel with security constraints, as evident in the sequel.
At this point, we wish to differentiate our investigation from earlier relevant works. The relay
channel with confidential messages was studied in [13], [14], where the relay node acts both as
an eavesdropper and a helper. In the model of [14], the source sends common messages to the
destination using the help of the relay node, but also sends private messages to the destination
while keeping them secret from the relay. In contrast with [14], the relay node in our work acts
as a trusted “third-party” whose sole goal is to facilitate secure communications (imposing an
additional security constraint on the relay node is also considered in Section IV). The idea of
using a “third-party” to facilitate secure communications also appeared in [15]. Contrary to our
work, which considers noisy channels, [15] focused on the generation of common random secret
keys at two nodes under the assist of a third-party using a noiseless public discussion channel. The
users then use the secret key to establish a secure link between the source-destination pair. Other
recent works on secure communications investigated the multiple access channel (MAC) with
confidential messages [16], [17], the multiple access channel with a degraded wiretapper [18],
and MIMO secure communications [19]. In summary, it appears that our relay-eavesdropper
model is fundamentally different from the models considered in all previous works.
Throughout the paper, upper-case letter X denotes a random variable, lower-case letter x
denotes a realization of the random variable, calligraphic letter X denotes a finite alphabet set.
Boldface letter x denotes a vector, {·}T denotes transpose and {·}H denotes conjugate transpose.
We also let [x]+ = max{0, x}.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we introduce the system model
and our notations. Section III describes the proposed cooperation strategies and characterizes
the corresponding achievable performance. The rate-equivocation outer-bound is also developed
in this section. In Section IV, we discuss several examples that illustrate interesting aspects of
the relay-eavesdropper channel. Finally, Section V offers some concluding remarks and briefly
outlines possible venues for future research.
II. THE RELAY-EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL
We consider a four-terminal discrete channel consisting of finite sets X1,X2,Y ,Y1,Y2 and a
transition probability distribution p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2), as shown in Figure 1. Here, X1,X2 are the
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4channel inputs from the source and the relay respectively, while Y ,Y1,Y2 are the channel outputs
at the destination, relay and eavesdropper respectively. We impose the memoryless assumption,
i.e., the channel outputs (yi, y1,i, y2,i) at time i only depend on the channel inputs (x1,i, x2,i) at
time i. The source wishes to send the message W1 ∈ W1 = {1, · · · ,M} to the destination using
the (M,n) code consisting: 1) a stochastic encoder fn at the source that maps the message w1
to a codeword x1 ∈ X n1 , 2) a relay encoder that maps the signals (y1,1, y1,2, · · · , y1,i−1) received
before time i to the channel input x2,i, using the mapping ϕi: (Y1,1, Y1,2, · · · , Y1,i−1)→ X2,i, 3)
a decoding function φ: Yn →W1. The average error probability of a (M,n) code is defined as
P ne =
∑
w1∈W1
1
M
Pr{φ(y) 6= w1|w1 was sent}. (1)
The equivocation rate at the eavesdropper is defined as
Re =
1
n
H(W1|Y2). (2)
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Fig. 1: The relay eavesdropper channel.
The rate-equivocation pair (R1, Re) is said to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0, there exists a
sequence of codes (M,n) such that for any n ≥ n(ǫ), we have
R1 =
1
n
log2 M, (3)
P ne ≤ ǫ, (4)
1
n
H(W1|Y2) ≥ Re − ǫ. (5)
We further say that the perfect secrecy rate R1 is achievable if the rate-equivocation pair
(R1, R1) is achievable. Notice that if Y2 = φ (or some other constant), our model reduces to the
classical relay channel without security constraints.
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5III. MAIN RESULTS
Our first result establishes an outer-bound on the optimal rate-equivocation region of the
relay-eavesdropper channel.
Theorem 1: In the relay eavesdropper channel, for any rate-equivocation pair {R1, Re} with
P ne → 0 and the equivocation rate at the eavesdropper larger than Re − ǫ, there exist some
random variables U → (V1, V2) → (X1, X2) → (Y, Y1, Y2), such that (R1, Re) satisfies the
following conditions
R1 ≤ min{I(V1, V2;Y ), I(V1;Y, Y1|V2)},
Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ [I(V1, V2;Y |U)− I(V1, V2;Y2|U)]
+
. (6)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix I.
We now turn our attention to constructing cooperation strategies for the relay-eavesdropper
channel. Our first step is to characterize the achievable rate-equivocation region of Cover-El
Gamal Decode and Forward (DF) Strategy [4]. In DF cooperation strategy, the relay node will
first decode codewords and then re-encode the message to cooperate with the source. Here, we
use the regular coding and backward decoding scheme developed in the classical relay setting [7],
[20], with the important difference that each message will be associated with many codewords
in order to confuse the eavesdropper.
Theorem 2: The rate pairs in the closure of the convex hull of all (R1, Re) satisfying
R1 < min{I(V1, V2;Y ), I(V1;Y1|V2)},
Re < R1, (7)
Re < [min{I(V1, V2;Y ), I(V1;Y1|V2)} − I(V1, V2;Y2)]
+
,
for some distribution p(v1, v2, x1, x2, y1, y2, y) = p(v1, v2)p(x1, x2|v1, v2)p(y1, y2, y|x1, x2), are
achievable using the DF strategy.
Hence, for the DF scheme, the following perfect secrecy rate is achievable
R(DF )s = sup
p(v1,v2)
[min{I(V1, V2;Y ), I(V1;Y1|V2)} − I(V1, V2;Y2)]
+
. (8)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix II.
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6The channel between the source and the relay becomes a bottleneck for the DF strategy
when it is noisier than the source-destination channel. This motivates our Noise-Forwarding (NF)
scheme, where the relay node does not attempt to decode the message but sends codewords that
are independent of the source’s message. The enabling observation behind this scheme is that, in
the wiretap channel, in addition to its own information, the source should send extra codewords
to confuse the wiretapper. In our setting, this task can be accomplished by the relay by allowing
it to send independent codewords, which aid in confusing the eavesdropper.
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Fig. 2: The rate region of the compound MACs of the relay eavesdropper channel for a fixed
input distribution p(x1)p(x2).
Our NF scheme transforms the relay-eavesdropper channel into a compound multiple access
channel (MAC), where the source/relay to the receiver is the first MAC and source/relay to the
eavesdropper is the second one. Figure 2 shows the rate region of these two MACs for a fixed
input distribution p(x1)p(x2). In the figure, R1 is the codeword rate of the source, and R2 is
the codeword rate of the relay. We can observe from Figure 2a) that if the relay node does not
transmit, the perfect secrecy rate is zero for this input distribution since R1(A) < R1(C). On
the other hand, if the relay and the source coordinate their transmissions and operate at point
B, we can achieve the equivocation rate Re, which is strictly larger than zero. On the other
hand, in Figure 2b), we can still get a positive perfect secrecy rate by operating at point A in
the absence of the relay. But by moving the operating point to B, we can get a larger secrecy
rate. This illustrates the main idea of our Noise-Forwarding scheme. The next result establishes
the achievable rate-equivocation region for the NF scheme.
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7Theorem 3: The rate pairs in the closure of the convex hull of all (R1, Re) satisfying
R1 < I(V1;Y |V2),
Re < R1, (9)
Re < [I(V1;Y |V2) + min{I(V2;Y ), I(V2;Y2|V1)} −min{I(V2;Y ), I(V2;Y2)} − I(V1;Y2|V2)]
+
,
for some distribution p(v1, v2, x1, x2, y1, y2, y) = p(v1)p(v2)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2)p(y1, y2, y|x1, x2),
are achievable using the NF scheme.
Hence, for the NF scheme, the achievable perfect secrecy rate is
R(NF )s = sup
p(v1)p(v2)
[I(V1;Y |V2) + min{I(V2;Y ), I(V2;Y2|V1)}
−min{I(V2;Y ), I(V2;Y2)} − I(V1;Y2|V2)]
+
. (10)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix III.
The following comments are now in order.
1) The NF scheme is customized to the relay channel with security constraints which make
the transmission of codewords that are independent of the source message reasonable.
Also, in the NF scheme, the relay node does not need to listen to the source, and hence,
this scheme is more suited works for relay nodes limited by the half-duplex constraint [9],
[11], [21].
2) In NF cooperation, each user sends independent messages to the destination, which resem-
bles the MAC. Hence, NF cooperation can be adapted to the multiple access eavesdropper
channel where the multiple users in the MAC channel can help each other in communi-
cating securely with the destination without listening to each other (note that the results
in [18] were limited only to the case where the eavesdropped channel is a degraded version
of the channel seen by the destination). Our related results will be reported elsewhere.
Now, we study another cooperation scheme that does not require decoding at the relay:
Compress and Forward (CF). The CF cooperation strategy can be viewed as a generalization of
NF where, in addition to the independent codewords, the relay also sends a quantized version of
its noisy observations to the destination. This noisy version of the relay’s observations helps the
destination in decoding the source’s message, while the independent codewords help in confusing
the eavesdropper. The following result establishes the achievable rate-equivocation pair in the
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8case when I(X1; Yˆ1, Y |X2) ≤ I(X1; Yˆ1, Y2|X2), i.e., the source-eavesdropper channel is better
than the source-receiver channel, a situation of particular interest to us.
Theorem 4: The rate pairs in the closure of the convex hull of all (R1, Re) satisfying
R1 < I(X1; Yˆ1, Y |X2),
Re < R1, (11)
Re <
[
R0 + I(X1; Yˆ1, Y |X2)− I(X1, X2;Y2)
]+
,
subject to
min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} − R0 ≥ I(Y1; Yˆ1|X2), (12)
for some distribution p(x1, x2, y1, y2, y, yˆ1) = p(x1)p(x2)p(y1, y2, y|x1, x2)p(yˆ1|y1, x2), are achiev-
able using CF strategy.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix IV.
Three comments are now in order.
1) In Theorem 4, R0 is the rate of pure noise generated by the relay to confuse the eavesdrop-
per, while min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} −R0 is the part of the rate allocated to send the
compressed signal Yˆ1 to help the destination. If we set R0 = min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)},
this scheme becomes the NF scheme.
2) In order to enable analytical tractability, the coding/decoding scheme used in the proof is
slightly different from that of [4]. In [4], the destination uses sliding-window decoding,
while our proof uses backward decoding. Hence, the bound for Re provided here is a
lower-bound for the Re achieved by the CF scheme. One may be able to achieve a larger
Re using exactly the CF scheme proposed in [4]. But, unfortunately, we are not yet able
to bound Re when sliding-window decoding is used.
3) Compared with CF decoding, the proposed NF strategy enjoys the advantage of simplicity.
Also, if one only focuses on the perfect secrecy rate, it is easy to see that these two schemes
achieve identical performance. Again, this observation is limited to our lower bound on
Re in Theorem 4.
IV. EXAMPLES
This section discusses several examples that illustrate some unique features of the relay-
eavesdropper channel. For simplicity, we only focus on the perfect secrecy rate of various
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9schemes.
A. The Deaf Helper Phenomenon
The security constraints imposed on the network bring about a new phenomenon which we
call the deaf helper phenomenon, where the relay node can still help even it is totally ignorant
of the message transmitted from the source. In this setup, we impose an additional security
constraint on the relay node, and say a rate Rs is achievable for a deaf helper if for any ǫ > 0,
there exists a sequence of codes (M,n) such that for any n ≥ n(ǫ), we have
Rs =
1
n
log2 M, P
n
e ≤ ǫ,
1
n
H(W1|Y2) ≥ Rs − ǫ,
1
n
H(W1|Y1,X2) ≥ Rs − ǫ. (13)
In this case, the signal received by the relay node does not leak any information about the
transmitted message W1. This model describes a more conservative scenario where the source
does not trust the relay but still wishes to exploit the benefit brought by cooperation. We assume
that the relay node is not malicious and, hence, is willing to cooperate with the source2. The
following theorem characterizes the achievable perfect secrecy rate of the NF strategy in the
deaf-helper setting.
Theorem 5: The perfect secrecy rate of the NF scheme with an additional security constraint
on the relay node is Rs = max
p(v1)p(v2)
min{Rs1, Rs2}, where
Rs1 =
[
I(V1;Y |V2) + min{I(V2;Y ), I(V2;Y2|V1)} −min{I(V2;Y ), I(V2;Y2)} − I(V1;Y2|V2)
]+
,
Rs2 = [I(V1;Y |V2)− I(V1;Y1|X2)]
+.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix V.
B. The Reversely Degraded Relay-Eavesdropper Channel
In the classical relay channel without security constraints, there exist some scenarios where
the relay node does not provide any gain, for example, the reversely degraded relay channel
shown in [4]. Here, we focus on this scenario and show that the relay node can still offer a gain
in the presence of the eavesdropper.
2If the relay node is malicious, it can then send signals that are dependent with signal received and then could even block
the transmission of the main channel.
February 1, 2008 DRAFT
10
Definition 1 ( [4]): The relay channel is called reversely degraded, if p(y, y1|x1, x2) = p(y|x1, x2)
p(y1|y, x2).
The following result, borrowed from [4], states the capacity of the classical reversely degraded
relay channel.
Theorem 6 (Theorem 2, [4]): The capacity of the reversely degraded relay channel is
C0 = max
x2
max
p(x1)
I(X1;Y |x2). (14)
This result implies that the relay node should send a constant, and hence, does not contribute
new information to the destination. In most channel models, the constant sent by the relay does
not result in any capacity gain. The question now is whether the same conclusion holds in the
presence of an eavesdropper. We first observe that the degradedness of the relay channel implies
that DF and CF cooperation will not provide the destination with additional useful information.
The relay node, however, can still send codewords independent of the received signal to confuse
the eavesdropper, as proposed in the NF scheme. Since we do not require decoding at the relay
node in the proof of Theorem 3, the degradedness imposed here does not affect the performance.
Hence, we get the following achievable perfect secrecy rate for the reversely degraded relay-
eavesdropper channel.
Corollary 1: The achievable perfect secrecy rate of the reversely degraded relay eavesdropper
channel is
Rs = max
p(v1)p(v2)
[
I(V1;Y |V2) + min{I(V2;Y ), I(V2;Y2|V1)}
−min{I(V2;Y ), I(V2;Y2)} − I(V1;Y2|V2)
]+
. (15)
C. The AWGN Channel
Now we consider the Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel, where the signal received at each
node is
yj[n] =
∑
i6=j
hijxi[n] + zj [n],
here hij is the channel coefficient between node i ∈ {s, r} and node j ∈ {r, w, d}, and zj is the
i.i.d Gaussian noise with unit variance at node j. The source and the relay have average power
constraint P1, P2 respectively.
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In [22], it was shown that the secrecy capacity of the degraded Gaussian wiretap channel is
[CM − CMW ]+, where CM , CMW are the capacity of the main channel and wiretap channel,
respectively. This result is also shown to be valid for stochastically degraded channel [17]. In
our case, if the relay does not transmit, the relay eavesdropper channel becomes a Gaussian
eavesdropper channel, which can always be converted into a stochastically degraded chan-
nel as done in the Gaussian broadcast channel [23]. Applying this result to our case, the
secrecy capacity of the Gaussian eavesdropper channel without the relay node is given by[
1
2
log2(1 + |hsd|
2P1)−
1
2
log2(1 + |hsw|
2P1)
]+
. Hence if |hsw|2 ≥ |hsd|2 and the relay does not
transmit, the secrecy capacity is zero, no matter how large P1 is. On the other hand, as shown
later, the relay can facilitate the source-destination pair to achieve a positive perfect secrecy rate
under some conditions even when |hsw|2 ≥ |hsd|2. In the following, we focus on such scenarios.
1) DF and NF: At this point, we do not know the optimal input distribution that maximizes
R
(DF )
s , R
(NF )
s . Here, we let V1 = X1, V2 = X2 and use a Gaussian input distribution to obtain
an achievable lower bound.
For DF cooperation scheme, we let X2 ∼ N (0, P2), X10 ∼ N (0, P ), where N (0, P ) is the
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance P . Also, we let
X1 = c1X2 +X10,
where c1 is a constant to be specified later. In this relationship, the novel information is modelled
by X10, whereas X2 represents the part of the signal which the source and the relay cooperate
in beamforming towards the destination. To satisfy the average power constraint at the source,
we require |c1|2P2 + P ≤ P1.
Straightforward calculations result in
I(X1;Y1|X2) =
1
2
log2(1 + |hsr|
2P ),
I(X1, X2;Y ) =
1
2
log2(1 + |hsdc1 + hrd|
2P2 + |hsd|
2P ),
I(X1, X2;Y2) =
1
2
log2(1 + |hswc1 + hrw|
2P2 + |hsw|
2P ).
Hence, we have
R(DF )s = max
c1,P
[
min
{1
2
log2
( 1 + |hsr|2P
1 + |hswc1 + hrw|2P2 + |hsw|2P
)
,
1
2
log2
( 1 + |hsdc1 + hrd|2P2 + |hsd|2P
1 + |hswc1 + hrw|2P2 + |hsw|2P
)}]+
. (16)
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For NF, we let X1 ∼ N (0, P1), X2 ∼ N (0, P2). Here X1, X2 are independent, resulting in
I(X1;Y |X2) =
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hsd|
2P1
)
,
I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Y2) =
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hsd|
2P1 + |hrd|
2P2
1 + |hsw|2P1 + |hrw|2P2
)
,
I(X2;Y2|X1) + I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1, X2;Y2) =
1
2
log2
(
(1 + |hrw|2P2)(1 + |hsd|2P1)
1 + |hsw|2P1 + |hrw|2P2
)
.
Hence, we have
R(NF )s =
[
min
{
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hsd|
2P1
)
,
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hsd|2P1 + |hrd|2P2
1 + |hsw|2P1 + |hrw|2P2
)
, (17)
1
2
log2
(
(1 + |hrw|2P2)(1 + |hsd|2P1)
1 + |hsw|2P1 + |hrw|2P2
)}]+
.
2) Amplify and Forward: In this subsection, we quantify the achievable secrecy rate of
Amplify and Forward (AF) cooperation3. In AF, the source encodes its messages into codewords
with length ML each, and divides each codeword into L sub-blocks each with M symbols, where
L is chosen to be sufficiently large. At each sub-block, the relay sends a linear combination of
the received noisy signal of this sub-block so far. For simplicity, we limit our discussion to
M = 2. In this case, the source sends X1(1) at the first symbol interval of each sub-block,
the relay receives Y1(1) = hsrX1(1) + Z1(1); At the second symbol interval, the source sends
αX1(1) + βX1(2), while the relay sends γY1(1). Here α, β, γ are chosen to satisfy the average
power constraints of the source and the relay. Thus, this scheme allows beam-forming between
the source and relay without requiring the relay to fully decode.
Writing the signal received at the destination and the eavesdropper in matrix form, we have
Y = H1X1 + Z, Y2 = H2X1 + Z2, (18)
where
H1 =
[
hsd 0
βhsd + γhsrhrd αhsd
]
,H2 =
[
hsw 0
βhsw + γhsrhrw αhsw
]
,
X1 = [X1(1), X1(2)]
T ,Z = [Z(1), γhrdZ1(1) + Z(2)]
T ,Z2 = [Z2(1), γhrwZ1(1) + Z2(2)]
T ,
Y = [Y (1), Y (2)]T ,Y2 = [Y2(1), Y2(2)]
T . (19)
3 We did not consider this scheme in the discrete case since, in general, it does not lend itself to a single letter characterization.
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The channel under consideration can be viewed as an equivalent standard memoryless eavesdrop-
per channel with input X1 and outputs Y,Y2 at the destination and the eavesdropper respectively.
Then, based on the result of [3], an achievable perfect secrecy rate is [I(X1;Y)− I(X1;Y2)]+.
Choosing a Gaussian input with covariance matrix E{XXH} = P I, where I is the identity
matrix, we get the following perfect secrecy rate
R(AF )s = max
α,β,γ,P
[
1
4
log2
| det{PH1HH1 + E{ZZ
H}}|
| det{E{ZZH}}|
−
1
4
log2
| det{PH2HH2 + E{Z2Z
H
2 }}|
| det{E{Z2ZH2 }}|
]+
= max
α,β,γ,P
[
1
4
log2
| det{PH1HH1 + A} detB|
| det{PH2HH2 + B} detA|
]+
, (20)
where
A =
[
1 0
0 1 + |γhrd|2
]
,B =
[
1 0
0 1 + |γhrw|2
]
,
and the maximization is over the set of power constraints:
(1 + |α|2 + |β|2)P ≤ 2P1,
|γ|2(|hsr|
2P + 1) ≤ 2P2. (21)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
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Fig. 3: The achievable perfect secrecy rate of the proposed schemes in the Gaussian relay
eavesdropper channel.
3) Numerical Results: In this subsection, we give numerical results under two channel models.
The first is the real channel where hij = d−γij , with dij being the distance between node i and
j and γ > 1 is the channel attenuation coefficient. In the second model, we assume that each
channel experiences an independent phase fading, that is hij = d−γij ejθij , where θij is uniformly
distributed over [0, 2π). We believe that the second model is more practically relevant than the
real channel scenario.
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Fig. 4: The network topology.
Figure 3 shows the achievable perfect secrecy rate of the proposed schemes for the first
channel model. In generating this figure, we use the network topology shown in Figure 4,
where we put the source at (0, 0), the destination at (1, 0), the eavesdropper at (0, 1), and the
relay node at (x, 0). We let P1 = 1, P2 = 8. Since dsd = dsw, the perfect secrecy capacity of
the eavesdropper channel without the relay node is zero. But, as shown in the figure, we can
achieve a positive secrecy rate by introducing a relay node. In computing the upper-bound, we set
V1 ∼ N (0, P1), V2 ∼ N (0, P2) with a correlation coefficient ρ, and maximize over ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
Notice that the Gaussian input is not necessarily optimal for the upper-bound. We can see that,
when the relay is near the source, the DF scheme touches the Gaussian upper-bound. Also,
when x > 1, it is clear that DF cooperation does not offer any gain, while NF and AF still
offer positive rates. Notice that when x > 1, both dsr ,dsd are larger than dsw. The interesting
observation here is that though both the destination and relay are in disadvantage positions
compared with the eavesdropper, they can cooperate with each other and gain some advantage
over the eavesdropper. If the relay is at 0, our model is equivalent to the case where the source
has two antennas. Notice that the upper-bound of the perfect secrecy capacity is zero under this
scenario. Hence, increasing the number of transmitting antenna at the source does not increase
the secrecy capacity under the real channel model. On the other hand, if there is a relay node at
an appropriate position, we can exploit this relay node to establish a secure source-destination
link.
In the second scenario, we assume that before transmission, the source knows the phases
θsr, θsd, θrd, but does not know θsw, θrw. The random phase will not affect the achievable perfect
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Fig. 5: The achievable perfect secrecy capacity for various schemes in the Gaussian relay
eavesdropper channel with phase fading.
secrecy rate of NF since it does not depend on beam-forming between the source and relay.
But, the rates of DF and AF are different here. In both cases, the source can adjust its phase
according to the knowledge of the phase information about θsr, θsd, θrd. In this way, the signals
of the source and the relay will add up coherently at the destination, but not at the eavesdropper
since θsw, θrw are independent of θsd, θrd, θsr. The secrecy rate of DF and AF could then be
obtained by averaging (16), (20) over the random phases. Figure 5 shows the achievable perfect
secrecy rates of the proposed strategies for the same setup as the first scenario. Due to the
random phases, the achievable perfect secrecy capacity when the relay is at the same position as
the source is not zero anymore. In this case, it will be beneficial to have multiple transmitting
antennas at the source. Similar to the first scenario, when x > 1, DF cooperation does not offer
any benefit. But both NF and AF still enjoy non-zero secrecy rates.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the relay-eavesdropper channel was studied. In particular, several cooperation
strategies were proposed and the corresponding achievable performance bounds were obtained.
Furthermore, an outer-bound on the optimal rate-equivocation region for this channel was devel-
oped. Of particular interest is the proposed NF strategy which was used to illustrate the deaf-
helper phenomenon, and to demonstrate the utility of the relay node in the reversely degraded
relay-eavesdropper channel. Overall, our results establish the critical role of user cooperation in
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facilitating secure wireless communications and shed light on the unique feature of the relay-
eavesdropper channel.
Among the many open problems posed by our work, how to close the gap between the
achievable performance and the outer-bound is arguably the most important one. This problem
is expected to be challenging since the capacity of the classical relay channel remains unknown.
The investigation of the role of feedback in the relay-eavesdropper channel is another interesting
problem. In the relay channel without security constraints, noiseless/noisy feedback was shown
to be beneficial. On the other hand, in the presence of an eavesdropper, the role and optimal
mechanism of feedback is not yet known, since the eavesdropper could also benefit from the
feedback signal. Finally, extending our work to a large scale network is expected to be of practical
significance.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof follows that of [3].
nRe = H(W1|Y
n
2 ) (22)
= H(W1)− I(W1;Y
n
2 ) (23)
= I(W1;Y
n)− I(W1;Y
n
2 ) +H(W1|Y
n) (24)
≤
n∑
i=1
[I(W1;Yi|Y
i−1)− I(W1;Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1)] + nδn, (25)
where Y i−1 = Y (1, · · · , i − 1), Y n2,i+1 = Y2(i + 1, · · · , n), and δn → 0 as n → ∞. We get this
by using the chain rule to expand I(W1;Y n) from i = 1 and expand I(W1;Y n2 ) from i = n,
also we use the Fano’s inequality to bound H(W1|Y n).
We continue
nRe ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(W1;Yi|Y
i−1)− I(W1;Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1)] + nδn (26)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1;Yi|Y
i−1)− I(Y n2,i+1;Yi|Y
i−1,W1) (27)
−I(W1, Y
i−1;Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1) + I(Y
i−1;Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1,W1)] + nδn (28)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1;Yi|Y
i−1)− I(W1, Y
i−1;Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1)] + nδn, (29)
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since
n∑
i=1
I(Y n2,i+1;Yi|Y
i−1,W1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1;Y2,i|Y n2,i+1,W1), which is proved in the lemma 7
of [3]. Now
nRe ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1;Yi|Y
i−1)− I(W1, Y
i−1;Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1)] + nδn (30)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Y n2,i+1;Yi|Y
i−1) + I(W1;Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)
−I(Y i−1;Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1)− I(W1;Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + nδn (31)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1;Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1;Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + nδn, (32)
since
n∑
i=1
I(Y n2,i+1;Yi|Y
i−1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1;Y2,i|Y
n
2,i+1), which is also proved in [3].
Now, let J be a random variable uniformly distributed over {1, · · · , n}, set U = JY i−1Y n2,i+1,V1 =
JY n2,i+1W1, V2 = JY
i−1, Y1 = Y1,J , Y2 = Y2,J , Y = YJ , X1 = X1,J , X2 = X2,J we have
Re ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1;Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1;Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1;Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1, Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1;Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
= I(V1, V2;Y |U)− I(V1, V2;Y2|U) + δn. (33)
Since the channel is memoryless, one can then check that U → (V1, V2) → (X1, X2) →
(Y, Y1, Y2) is a Markov chain. In the following, we bound R1.
I(W1;Y) =
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Yi|Y
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi|Y
i−1)−H(Yi|W1, Y
i−1)]
≤
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi)−H(Yi|W1, Y
i−1)]
≤
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi)−H(Yi|W1, Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)]
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1;Yi). (34)
Hence
R1 ≤
1
n
I(W1;Y) ≤ I(V1, V2;Y ). (35)
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Also
I(W1;Y) =
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Yi|Y
i−1)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Yi, Y1,i|Y
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi, Y1,i|Y
i−1)−H(Yi, Y1,i|W1, Y
i−1)]
≤
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi, Y1,i|Y
i−1)−H(Yi, Y1,i|W1, Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)]
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1;Yi, Y1,i|Y
i−1). (36)
Hence, we have
R1 ≤
1
n
I(W1;Y) = I(V1;Y, Y1|V2). (37)
So, we have
R1 ≤ min{I(V1, V2;Y ), I(V1;Y, Y1|V2)}. (38)
The claim is proved.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof is a combination of the coding schemes of Csisza´r et. al. [3] and the regular
coding and backward decoding scheme in the relay channel [7], [20]. We first replace V1, V2
in Theorem 2 with X1, X2. After proving Theorem 2 with V1, V2 replaced by X1, X2, we then
prefix a memoryless channel with input V1, V2 and transmission probability p(x1, x2|v1, v2) as
reasoned in [3] to finish our proof.
1) Codebook generation:
For a given distribution p(x1, x2), we first generate at random 2nR i.i.d n-sequence at the
relay node each drawn according to p(x2) =
∏n
i=1 p(x2,i), index them as x2(a), a ∈
[1, 2nR], where R = min{I(X1, X2;Y ), I(X1;Y1|X2)} − ǫ0. For each x2(a), generate
2nR conditionally independent n-sequence x1(k, a), k ∈ [1, 2nR] drawn randomly accord-
ing to p(x1|x2(a)) =
∏n
i=1 p(x1,i|x2,i(a)). Define W = {1, · · · , 2n[R−I(X1,X2;Y2)]}, L =
{1, · · · , 2nI(X1,X2;Y2)} and K =W ×L = {1, · · · , 2nR}.
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2) Encoding
We exploit the block Markov coding scheme, as argued in [4], the loss induced by this
scheme is negligible as the number of blocks B →∞.
For a given rate pair (R1, Re) with R1 ≤ R and Re ≤ R1, we give the following coding
strategy. Let the message to be transmitted at block i be w1(i) ∈ W1 = {1, · · · ,M}, where
M = 2nR1 .
The stochastic encoder at the transmitter first forms the following mappings.
• If R1 > R−I(X1, X2;Y2), then we letW1 =W×J , where J = {1, · · · , 2n(R1−[R−I(X1,X2;Y2)])}.
We let g1 be the partition that partitions L into |J | equal size subsets. The stochastic
encoder at transmitter will choose a mapping for each message w1(i) = (w(i), j(i))→
(w(i), l(i)), where l(i) is chosen randomly from the set g−11 (j(i)) ⊂ L with uniform
distribution.
• If R1 < R − I(X1, X2;Y2), the stochastic encoder will choose a mapping w1(i) →
(w1(i), l(i)), where l(i) is chosen uniformly from the set L.
Assume that the message w1(i − 1) transmitted at block i − 1 is associated with (w(i −
1), l(i−1)) and the message w1(i) intended to send at block i is associated with (w(i), l(i))
by the stochastic encoder at the transmitter. We let a(i − 1) = (w(i − 1), l(i − 1)) and
b(i) = (w(i), l(i)). The encoder then sends x1(b(i), a(i− 1)). The relay has an estimation
ˆˆa(i− 1) (see the decoding part), and thus sends the corresponding codeword x2(ˆˆa(i− 1)).
At block 1, the source sends x1(b(1), 1), the relay sends x2(1).
At block B, the source sends x1(1, a(B − 1)), and the relay sends x2(ˆˆa(B − 1)).
3) Decoding
At the end of block i, the relay already has an estimation of the ˆˆa(i − 1), which was
sent at block i− 1, and will declare that it receives ˆˆa(i), if this is the only pair such that
(x1(ˆˆa(i), ˆˆa(i − 1)),x2(ˆˆa(i − 1)),y1(i)) are jointly typical. Since R = min{I(X1;Y1|X2),
I(X1, X2;Y )} − ǫ ≤ I(X1;Y1|X2)− ǫ, then based on the AEP, one has ˆˆa(i) = a(i) with
probability goes to 1.
The destination decodes from the last block, i.e. block B. Suppose that at the end of block
B − 1, the relay decodes successfully, then the destination will declare that aˆ(B − 1) is
received, if (x1(1, aˆ(B − 1)),x2(aˆ(B − 1)),y) are jointly typical. It’s easy to see that if
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R ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ), we will have aˆ(B − 1) = a(B − 1) with probability goes to 1, as n
increases.
After getting aˆ(B−1), the receiver can get an estimation of a(i), i ∈ [1, B−2] in a similar
way.
Having aˆ(i−1), the destination can get the estimation of the message w1(i−1) by letting
1) wˆ1(i− 1) = (wˆ(i− 1), jˆ(i− 1)) = (wˆ(i− 1), g1(lˆ(i− 1))) if R1 > R− I(X1, X2;Y2),
2) wˆ1(i− 1) = wˆ(i− 1) if R1 < R− I(X1, X2;Y2).
The probability that wˆ1(i− 1) = w1(i− 1) goes to one for sufficiently large n.
4) Equivocation Computation
H(W1|Y2) = H(W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
= H(W1,Y2,X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
= H(X1,X2) +H(W1,Y2|X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
≥ H(X1) +H(Y2|X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2). (39)
First, let us calculate H(X1,X2|W1,Y2). Given W1, the eavesdropper can also do back-
ward decoding as the receiver. At the end of block B, given W1, the eavesdropper knows
w(B−1), hence it will decode l(B−1), by letting l(B−1) = lˆ(B−1), if lˆ(B−1) is the
only one such that (x1(1, (w(B − 1), lˆ(B − 1))),x2((w(B − 1), lˆ(B − 1))),y) are jointly
typical. Since l ∈ [1, 2nI(X1,X2;Y2)], we have
Pr{(X1(1, a(i− 1)),X2(ˆˆa(i− 1)))
6= (X1(1, (w(B − 1), lˆ(B − 1))),X2((w(B − 1), lˆ(B − 1))))} ≤ ǫ1. (40)
Then based on Fano’s inequality, we have
1
n
H(X1,X2|W1 = w1,Y2) ≤
1
n
+ ǫ1I(X1, X2;Y2) (41)
Hence, we have
1
n
H(X1,X2|W1,Y2) =
1
n
∑
w1∈W1
p(W1 = w1)H(X1,X2|W1 = w1,Y2) ≤ ǫ2, (42)
when n is sufficiently large.
Since the channel is memoryless, we have H(Y2)−H(Y2|X1,X2) ≤ nI(X1, X2;Y2)+nδn,
where δn → 0, as n→∞ [2].
February 1, 2008 DRAFT
21
Now, from the code construction, we have H(X1) = nR if R1 > R−I(X1, X2;Y2). In this
case, we get nRe = H(W1|Y2) ≥ n(R− I(X1, X2;Y2)− ǫ3). If R1 ≤ R− I(X1, X2;Y2),
H(X1) = n(R1 + I(X1, X2;Y2)), in this case, we get the perfect secrecy, since
nRe ≥ n(R1 + I(X1, X2;Y2))− nI(X1, X2;Y2)− nǫ3 ≥ n(R1 − ǫ3).
The claim is proved.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
As [3], we first prove the result for the case where V1, V2 in Theorem 3 are replaced with
X1, X2, then prefix a memoryless channel with transition probability p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2) to finish
our proof.
We first consider the case I(X1;Y |X2) < I(X1;Y2|X2), i.e., the channel between the source
and the eavesdropper is better than the channel between the source and the destination. In this
case, we only need to consider min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2)} = I(X2;Y2), otherwise, the secrecy
rate will be zero. Thus in this case, the last equation in (9) changes to Re <
[
I(X1;Y |X2) +
min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} − I(X1, X2;Y2)
]+
.
1) Codebook generation:
For a given distribution p(x1)p(x2), we generate at random 2nR2 i.i.d n-sequence at the
relay node each drawn according to p(x2) =
∏n
i=1 p(x2,i), index them as x2(a), a ∈
[1, 2nR2], where we set R2 = min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} − ǫ. We also generate random
2nR i.i.d n-sequence at the source each drawn according to p(x1) =
∏n
i=1 p(x1,i), index
them as x1(k), k ∈ [1, 2nR], where R = I(X1;Y |X2)− ǫ. Let
R
′
= min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}+ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1, X2;Y2),
and define W = {1, · · · , 2nR
′
}, L = {1, · · · , 2n(R−R
′
)} and K =W ×L = {1, · · · , 2nR}.
2) Encoding
For a given rate pair (R1, Re) with R1 ≤ R,Re ≤ R1, we give the following coding
strategy. Let the message to be transmitted at block i be w1(i) ∈ W1 = [1,M ], where
M = 2nR1 .
The stochastic encoder at the transmitter first forms the following mappings.
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• If R1 > R
′
, then we let W1 = W × J , where J = {1, 2n(R1−R
′
)}. We let g1 be the
partition that partitions L into |J | equal size subsets. The stochastic encoder at trans-
mitter will choose a mapping for each message w1(i) = (w(i), j(i)) → (w(i), l(i)),
where l(i) is chosen randomly from the set g−11 (j(i)) ⊂ L with uniform distribution.
• If R1 < R
′
, the stochastic encoder will choose a mapping w1(i)→ (w1(i), l(i)), where
l(i) is chosen uniformly from the set L.
Suppose the message w1(i) intended to send at block i is associated with (w(i), l(i)) by
the stochastic encoder at the transmitter. The encoder then sends x1((w(i), l(i))). The relay
uniformly picks a code x2(a) from a ∈ [1, · · · , 2nR2], and sends x2(a).
3) Decoding
At the end of block i, the destination declares that aˆ(i) is received, if aˆ(i) is the only one
such that (x2(aˆ(i)),y) are jointly typical. If there does not exist or there exist more than one
such sequences, the destination declares an error. Since R2 = min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}−
ǫ ≤ I(X2;Y )− ǫ, then based on AEP, we know that the error probability will be less than
any given positive number ǫ, when the codeword length n is long enough.
The destination then declares that kˆ is received, if kˆ is the only one such that (x1(kˆ),x2(aˆ),y)
are jointly typical, otherwise declares an error. Since R = I(X1;Y |X2) − ǫ, then based
on AEP, we know that we will have error probability goes to zero, when n is sufficiently
large.
Having kˆ(i), the destination can get the estimation of the message w1(i) by letting
1) wˆ1(i) = (wˆ(i), jˆ(i)) = (wˆ(i), g1(lˆ(i))), if R1 > R′ ,
2) wˆ1(i) = wˆ(i), if R1 < R′ .
The probability that wˆ1(i) = w1(i) goes to one for sufficiently large n.
4) Equivocation Computation
H(W1|Y2) = H(W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
= H(W1,Y2,X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
= H(X1,X2) +H(W1,Y2|X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
≥ H(X1,X2) +H(Y2|X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2). (43)
Now let’s calculate H(X1,X2|W1,Y2). Given W1, the eavesdropper can do joint decoding.
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At any block i, given W1, the eavesdropper knows w(i), hence it will decode l(i) and a(i)
sent by the relay, by letting l(i) = lˆ(i), a(i) = aˆ(i), if lˆ(i), aˆ(i) are the only one such that
(x1(w(i), lˆ(i)),x2(aˆ(i)),y) are jointly typical. Then, since R2 = min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}−
ǫ ≤ I(X2;Y2|X1)− ǫ, we get
1
2
log2(|L|) +R2 = R + I(X1, X2;Y2)−min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}
−I(X1;Y |X2) + min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} − ǫ
≤ I(X1, X2;Y2)− ǫ, (44)
Also, we have 1
2
log2(|L|) < R ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2)− ǫ.
So Pr{(X1(w(i), lˆ(i)),X2(aˆ(i))) 6= (X1(w(i), l(i)),X2(a(i)))} ≤ ǫ1.
Then based on Fano’s inequality, we have
1
n
H(X1,X2|W1 = w1,Y2) ≤
1
n
+ ǫ1I(X1, X2;Y2) (45)
Hence, we have
1
n
H(X1,X2|W1,Y2) =
1
n
∑
w1∈W1
p(W1 = w1)H(X1,X2|W1 = w1,Y2) ≤ ǫ2, (46)
when n is sufficiently large.
Now, H(Y2)−H(Y2|X1,X2) ≤ nI(X1, X2;Y2) + nδn, where δn → 0, as n→∞.
Also we have H(X1,X2) = H(X1)+H(X2) since x1 and x2 are independent. If R1 > R
′
,
we have H(X1,X2) = R+R2 = I(X1;Y |X2)+min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}. Combining
these, we get nRe = H(W1|Y2) ≥ n(min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} + I(X1;Y |X2)) −
nI(X1, X2;Y2)− nǫ4.
On the other hand, if R1 < R
′
, we have H(X1) = R1+I(X1, X2;Y2)−min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)},
hence we have H(X1,X2) = R1 + I(X1, X2;Y2) − ǫ. We get perfect secrecy rate, since
nRe = H(W1|Y2) ≥ nR1 − nǫ4.
This case is proved.
Now, consider the case I(X1;Y |X2) > I(X1;Y2|X2). If min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2)} = I(X2;Y ),
then we have min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} = I(X2;Y ), because I(X2;Y2|X1) > I(X2;Y2)
since X1, X2 are independent. Under this case, we only need to prove Re ≤ I(X1;Y |X2) −
I(X1;Y2|X2) are achievable, which can be achieved by letting the codeword rate be I(X1;Y |X2)
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and R′ = I(X1;Y |X2) − I(X1;Y |X2). Now the equivocation rate of the eavesdropper can be
calculated as
H(W1|Y2) ≥ H(W1|Y2,X2)
= H(W1,Y2|X2)−H(Y2|X2)
= H(W1,Y2,X1|X2)−H(X1|W1,Y2,X2)−H(Y2|X2)
= H(X1|X2) +H(W1,Y2|X1,X2)−H(X1|W1,Y2,X2)−H(Y2|X2)
≥ H(X1) +H(Y2|X1,X2)−H(X1|W1,Y2,X2)−H(Y2|X2), (47)
since x1,x2 are independent. This can then be shown to be larger than n(I(X1;Y |X2) −
I(X1;Y2|X2)− ǫ).
If min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2)} = I(X2;Y2), the last line in (9) changes to Re <
[
I(X1;Y |X2)+
min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} − I(X1, X2;Y2)
]+
, then we can use a coding/decoding scheme
similar to the one developed above to show the achievability.
The claim is achieved.
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The proof is a combination of the coding scheme of Csisza´r et. al. [3] and a revised CF
scheme in the relay channel [4].
1) Codebook generation:
We first generate at random 2nR i.i.d n-sequence x1 at the source node each drawn accord-
ing to p(x1) =
n∏
j=1
p(x1,j), index them as x1(k), k ∈ [1, 2nR], with R = I(X1; Yˆ1, Y |X2)−ǫ.
Generate at random 2nR2 i.i.d n-sequence x2 each with probability p(x2) =
n∏
j=1
p(x2,j).
Index these as x2(s), s ∈ [1, 2nR2], where
R2 = min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} − ǫ.
For each x2(s), generate at random 2n(R2−R0) i.i.d yˆ1, each with probability p(yˆ1|x2(s)) =
n∏
j=1
p(yˆ1,j|x2,j(s)). Label these yˆ1(z, s), z ∈ [1, 2nRˆ], s ∈ [1, 2nR2], where we set Rˆ =
R2 − R0. Equally divide these 2nR2 x2 sequences into 2nRˆ bins, hence there are 2nR0 x2
sequences at each bin. Let f be this mapping, that is z = f(s).
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Let R′ = min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}+ I(X1; Yˆ1, Y |X2)− I(X1, X2;Y2).
Define W = {1, · · · , 2nR
′
}, L = {1, · · · , 2n(R−R
′
)} and K =W ×L = {1, · · · , 2nR}.
2) Encoding
We exploit the block Markov coding scheme.
For a given rate pair (R1, Re), where R1 ≤ R,Re ≤ R1, we give the following coding
strategy. Let the message to be transmitted at block i be w1(i) ∈ W1 = [1,M ], where
M = 2nR1 . We require R1 ≤ R.
The stochastic encoder at the transmitter first forms the following mappings.
• If R1 > R
′
, we let W1 =W×J , where J = {1, 2n(R1−R
′
)}. We let g1 be the partition
that partitions L into |J | equal size subsets. The stochastic encoder at transmitter will
choose a mapping for each message w1(i) = (w(i), j(i))→ (w(i), l(i)), where l(i) is
chosen randomly from the set g−11 (j(i)) ⊂ L with uniform distribution.
• If R1 < R
′
, the stochastic encoder will choose a mapping w1(i)→ (w1(i), l(i)), where
l(i) is chosen uniformly from the set L.
At first consider block i, where i 6= 1, B, which means it’s not the first or the last block.
Assume that the message w1(i) intended to send at block i is associated with (w(i), l(i))
by the stochastic encoder at the transmitter. We let k(i) = (w(i), l(i)). Then the encoder at
the source sends x1(k(i)) at block i. At the end of block i− 1, we assume that (x2(s(i−
1)), yˆ1(z(i − 1), s(i − 1)),y1(i − 1)) are jointly typical4, then we choose s(i) uniformly
from bin z(i− 1), and the relay sends x2(s(i)) at block i.
When i = 1, the source sends x1(k(1)), the relay sends x2(1). When i = B, the source
sends x1(1), the relay sends x2(s(B)).
3) Decoding
First consider the relay node. At the end of block i, the relay already has s(i)5, it then
decides z(i) by choosing z(i) such that (x2(s(i)), yˆ1(z(i), s(i)),y1(i)) are jointly typical.
There exists such z(i), if
Rˆ ≥ I(Y1; Yˆ1|X2), (48)
and n is sufficiently large. Choose s(i+ 1) uniformly from bin z(i).
4See the decoding part, such z(i− 1) exists.
5At the end of block 1, relay knows s(i) = 1, this is the starting point.
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The destination does backward decoding. The decoding process starts at the last block B,
the destination decodes s(B) by choosing unique sˆ(B) such that (x2(sˆ(B)),y(B)) are
jointly typical. We will have sˆ(B) = s(B), if
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y ), (49)
and n is sufficiently large.
Next, the destination moves to the block B − 1. Now it already has s(B), hence we also
have z(B − 1) = f(s(B)). It first declares that sˆ(B − 1) is received, if sˆ(B − 1) is the
unique one such that (x2(sˆ(B − 1)),y(B − 1)) are jointly typical. If (49) is satisfied,
sˆ(B − 1) = s(B − 1) with high probability. After knowing sˆ(B − 1), the destination
gets an estimation of kˆ(B − 1), by picking the unique kˆ(B − 1) such that (x1(kˆ(B −
1)), yˆ1(z(B − 1), sˆ(B − 1)),y(B − 1),x2(sˆ(B − 1))) are jointly typical. We will have
kˆ(B − 1) = k(B − 1) with high probability, if
R ≤ I(X1; Yˆ1, Y |X2), (50)
and n is sufficiently large.
When the destination moves to block i, the destination has s(i+1) and hence z(i) = f(s(i+
1)). It first declares that sˆ(i) is received, by choosing unique sˆ(i) such that (x2(sˆ(i)),y(i))
are jointly typical. If (49) is satisfied, sˆ(i) = s(i) with high probability. After knowing
sˆ(i), the destination declares that kˆ(i) is received, if kˆ(i) is the unique one such that
(x1(kˆ(i)), yˆ1(z(i), sˆ(i)), y(i),x2(sˆ(i))) are jointly typical. If (50) is satisfied, kˆ(i) = k(i)
with high probability when n is sufficiently large.
Having kˆ(i), the destination can get the estimation of the message w1(i) by letting 1)
wˆ1(i) = (wˆ(i), jˆ(i)) = (wˆ(i), g1(lˆ(i))), if R1 > R−R
′
, 2) wˆ1(i) = wˆ(i), if R1 < R−R′ .
The probability that wˆ1(i) = w1(i) goes to one for sufficiently large n.
4) Equivocation Computation
H(W1|Y2) = H(W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
= H(W1,Y2,X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
= H(X1,X2) +H(W1,Y2|X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
≥ H(X1,X2) +H(Y2|X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2). (51)
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Following [2], we will have H(Y2) − H(Y2|X1,X2) ≤ nI(X1, X2;Y2) + nδn, where
δn → 0 as n→∞.
Now let’s calculate H(X1,X2|W1,Y2). Given W1, the eavesdropper can do joint decoding.
It does backward decoding. We pick up the story at block i, we suppose it already decodes
s(i+ 1) and hence z(i) = f(s(i+ 1)). Given W1, the eavesdropper knows w(i), hence it
will decode l(i) and s(i) sent by the relay, by letting l(i) = lˆ(i), s(i) = sˆ(i), if lˆ(i), sˆ(i)
are the only ones such that (x1(w(i), lˆ(i)),x2(sˆ(i)), yˆ1(z(i), sˆ(i)),y2(i)) are jointly typical.
Then, if R2 ≤ I(X2;Y2|X1) and (50) is satisfied, we have
1
2
log2(|L|) +R2 = R −R
′
+R2
= R −min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} − I(X1; Yˆ1, Y |X2)
+I(X1, X2;Y2) + min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}
≤ I(X1, X2;Y2). (52)
Also, we have
1
2
log2(|L|) < R ≤ I(X1; Yˆ1, Y2|X2).
Thus, we have
Pr{(X1(w(i), lˆ(i)),X2(sˆ(i))) 6= (X1(w(i), l(i)),X2(s(i)))} ≤ ǫ1. (53)
Then based on Fano’s inequality, we have
1
n
H(X1,X2, |W1 = w1,Y2) ≤
1
n
+ ǫ1I(X1, X2;Y2). (54)
Hence, we have
1
n
H(X1,X2|W1,Y2) =
1
n
∑
w1∈W1
p(W1 = w1)H(X1,X2|W1 = w1,Y2) ≤ ǫ2, (55)
when n is sufficiently large.
We know H(X1,X2) = H(X1) +H(X2|X1) ≥ n(R +R0).
If R1 > R
′
, we have H(X1) = nR, then we get
nRe = H(W1|Y2) ≥ n(R0 + I(X1; Yˆ1, Y |X2)− I(X1, X2;Y2)− ǫ4).
If R1 < R
′
, we have H(X1) = n(R1 +R− R
′
), hence
nRe = H(W1|Y2) ≥ nR1 + n(R0 −min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1))} − ǫ4).
The claim is proved.
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APPENDIX V
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
The proof follows closely with that of Theorem 3. We first consider the case I(X1;Y |X2) <
I(X1;Y2|X2), i.e., the channel between the source and the eavesdropper is better than the
channel between the source and the destination. In this case, we only need to consider the
case min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2)} = I(X2;Y2), otherwise, the perfect secrecy rate will be zero.
Thus in this case, Rs1 =
[
I(X1;Y |X2) + min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} − I(X1, X2;Y2)
]+
.
1) Codebook generation:
For a given distribution p(x1)p(x2), we generate at random 2nR2 i.i.d n-sequence at the
relay node each drawn according to p(x2) =
∏n
i=1 p(x2,i), index them as x2(a), a ∈
[1, 2nR2]. Here we set R2 = min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} − ǫ. We also generate random
2nR i.i.d n-sequence at the source each drawn according to p(x1) =
∏n
i=1 p(x1,i), index
them as x1(k), k ∈ [1, 2nR] with R = I(X1;Y |X2)− ǫ. Let
Rmin = min{Rs1, Rs2}, Rmax = max{Rs1, Rs2},
where Rs1 = min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}+I(X1;Y |X2)−I(X1, X2;Y2), Rs2 = I(X1;Y |X2)−
I(X1;Y1|X2). We now define W = {1, · · · , 2nRmin}, L1 = {1, · · · , 2n(Rmax−Rmin)}, L2 =
{1, · · · , 2n(R−Rmax)} and L = L1 ×L2, K =W ×L.
2) Encoding
Here, we consider perfect secrecy rate. For a given rate R1 ≤ Rmin, we give the following
coding strategy to show that for any given ǫ ≥ 0, the equivocation rate at the eavesdropper
and the relay node can be made to be larger or equal R1 − ǫ .
Let the message to be transmitted at block i be w1(i) ∈ W1 = [1,M ], where M =
2nR1 . The stochastic encoder will choose a mapping w1(i) → (w1(i), l1(i), l2(i)), where
l1(i), l2(i) are chosen uniformly from the set L1,L2 respectively. We write l(i) = (l1(i), l2(i)).
Suppose the message w1(i) intended to send at block i is associated with (w(i), l(i)) by
the stochastic encoder at the transmitter. The encoder then sends x1((w(i), l(i))). The relay
uniformly picks a code x2(a) from a ∈ [1, · · · , 2nR2], and sends x2(a).
3) Decoding
At the end of block i, the destination declares that aˆ(i) is received, if aˆ(i) is the only one
such that (x2(aˆ(i)),y) are jointly typical. If there does not exist or there exist more than one
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such sequences, the destination declares an error. Since R2 = min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}−
ǫ ≤ I(X2;Y )− ǫ, then based on AEP, we know that the error probability will be less than
any given positive number ǫ, when the codeword length n is long enough.
The destination then declares that kˆ is received, if kˆ is the only one such that (x1(kˆ),x2(aˆ),y)
are jointly typical, otherwise declares an error. Since R = I(X1;Y |X2) − ǫ, then based
on AEP, we know that we will have error probability goes to zero, when n is sufficiently
large.
Having kˆ(i), the destination can get the estimation of the message w1(i) by letting wˆ1(i) =
wˆ(i). The probability that wˆ1(i) = w1(i) goes to one for sufficiently large n.
4) Equivocation Computation
We first calculate the equivocation rate of the eavesdropper when Rs1 ≤ Rs2.
H(W1|Y2) = H(W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
= H(W1,Y2,X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
= H(X1,X2) +H(W1,Y2|X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2)
≥ H(X1,X2) +H(Y2|X1,X2)−H(X1,X2|W1,Y2)−H(Y2). (56)
Now let’s calculate H(X1,X2|W1,Y2). Given W1, the eavesdropper can do joint decoding.
At any block i, given W1, the eavesdropper knows w(i), hence it will decode l(i) =
(l1(i), l2(i)) and a(i) sent by the relay, by letting l(i) = lˆ(i), a(i) = aˆ(i), if lˆ(i), aˆ(i) are
the only one pair such that (x1(w(i), lˆ(i)),x2(aˆ(i)),y) are jointly typical. Since R2 =
min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} − ǫ ≤ I(X2;Y2|X1)− ǫ, we
1
2
log2(|L|) +R2 = R + I(X1, X2;Y2)−min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}
−I(X1;Y |X2) + min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} − ǫ
≤ I(X1, X2;Y2)− ǫ. (57)
Also, we have 1
2
log2(|L|) < R ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2).
So Pr{(X1(w(i), lˆ(i)),X2(aˆ(i))) 6= (X1(w(i), l(i)),X2(a(i)))} ≤ ǫ1.
Then based on Fano’s inequality, we have
1
n
H(X1,X2|W1 = w1,Y2) ≤
1
n
+ ǫ1I(X1, X2;Y2). (58)
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Hence, we have
1
n
H(X1,X2|W1,Y2) =
1
n
∑
w1∈W1
p(W1 = w1)H(X1,X2|W1 = w1,Y2) ≤ ǫ2, (59)
when n is sufficiently large.
Now, H(Y2) − H(Y2|X1,X2) ≤ nI(X1, X2;Y2) + nδn, where δn → 0, as n → ∞.
Also we have H(X1,X2) = H(X1) + H(X2) since x1 and x2 are independent. Now
H(X1) = R1 + I(X1, X2;Y2)−min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}, hence H(X1,X2) = R1 +
I(X1, X2;Y2)− ǫ.
We get nRe = H(W1|Y2) ≥ nR1 − nǫ4.
Now we calculate the equivocation rate at the relay node.
H(W1|Y1,X2) ≥ H(W1|Y1,X2, L1)
= H(W1,Y1, L1|X2)−H(Y1, L1|X2)
= H(W1, L1,Y1,X1|X2)−H(X1|W1, L1,Y1,X2)−H(Y1, L1|X2)
= H(X1|X2) +H(W1, L1,Y1|X1,X2)−H(X1|W1, L1,Y1,X2)−H(Y1, L1|X2)
(a)
≥ H(X1) +H(Y1|X1,X2)−H(X1|W1, L1,Y1,X2)−H(L1)−H(Y1|X2),
where the first term of (a) comes from the fact that x1,x2 are independent, and the fourth term
comes from the fact that l1,x2 are independent.
Now, H(L1) = n(Rmax−Rmin), H(Y1|X1,X2)−H(Y1|X2) ≤ nI(X1;Y1|X2)+nδn. Given
w1, l1,x2, the relay can just choose the x1 in the bin (w1, l1) which is jointly typical with x2,y1.
Since 1
n
log2(|L2|) ≤ I(X1;Y1|X2), we have Pr{Xˆ1 6= X1} ≤ ǫ2.
Then based on Fano’s inequality, we have
1
n
H(X1|W1 = w1, L1 = l1,Y1,X2 = x2) ≤
1
n
+ ǫ1I(X1;Y1|X2), (60)
Hence, we have
1
n
H(X1|W1, L1,Y1,X2) =
1
n
∑
w1,l1,x2
p(W1 = w1, L1 = l1,x2)H(X1,X2|W1 = w1, L1 = li,x2,Y1)
≤ ǫ2, (61)
when n is sufficiently large.
Also, based on the encoding part, we have H(X1) = n(R1 + I(X1;Y |X2)−Rmin).
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Combining these, we get
H(W1|Y1,X2) ≥ n(R1 + I(X1;Y |X2)−Rmin − (Rmax −Rmin)− I(X1;Y1|X2)− δn)
= n(R1 − δn). (62)
The equivocation rate of the relay and the eavesdropper when R1s ≥ R2s can be calculated
similarly, with the only difference that we bound the equivocation rate of the eavesdropper by
giving it L1. This case is proved.
Now, consider the case I(X1;Y |X2) > I(X1;Y2|X2). If min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2)} = I(X2;Y ),
then we have min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)} = I(X2;Y ), because I(X2;Y2|X1) > I(X2;Y2)
since X1, X2 are independent. Under this case, we only need to prove the case Rs1 =
[
I(X1;Y |X2)−
I(X1;Y2|X2)
]+
, which can be achieved by using a scheme similar to the one developed in
proving (47). If min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2)} = I(X2;Y2), and we only need to consider Rs1 =[
I(X1;Y |X2)+min{I(X2;Y ), I(X2;Y2|X1)}−I(X1, X2;Y2)
]+
, then we can use a coding/decoding
scheme similar to the one developed above to show the achievability.
The claim is achieved.
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